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used ancient manuscript illuminations as a 
source for the scenes decorating these secu-
lar objects intended most probably for the 
emperor, imperial family members or high 
court officials. 
Ancient motifs and models in Byzan-
tine art are further analyzed by Melita Em-
manouil in her article Ἡ ἀρχαιότητα στὴν 
ζωγραφικὴ τῶν Παλαιολόγων: Εἰκαστικοὶ 
τρόποι, μοτίβα καὶ εἰκονογραφικὰ θέματα 
[The Influence of Antiquity in Palaeologan 
Painting: Artistic Ways, Motifs and Iconog-
raphy]. The paper focuses in particular on 
the stylistic manners of Palaiologan paint-
ers and on the adaptation of ancient motifs 
to fit the Byzantine aesthetic. The author 
argues that Greek motifs were also used to 
strengthen Greek consciousness among the 
population in the period of decline. 
The last article in the volume, 
Ἐπανάχρηση ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν μελῶν τῆς 
ἀρχαιότητας σὲ ἐκκλησιαστικὰ καὶ κοσμικὰ 
κτήρια τοῦ Μυστρᾶ [Reused Architectural 
Elements of the Antiquity in Ecclesiastical 
and Secular Buildings at Mystras] by Stav-
ros Arvanitopoulos, offers an insight into an 
ongoing research project in one of the most 
prominent Byzantine cities of the Pelopon-
nese, Mystras. The author does not propose 
any definitive conclusions on the reemploy-
ment of architectural elements but rather 
suggests some explanations regarding their 
original use.             
The variety of topics addressed in this 
volume testifies to the diversity and, conse-
quently, to the significance of the influence 
of antiquity on Byzantine civilization. It 
highlights the extent of convergence be-
tween the two cultures – Christian and 
non-Christian – and shows once again how 
a Christian society looked back to antiquity 
for motifs and themes, modifying them in 
such a way as to make them respond to the 
aesthetical, social, political and philosophi-
cal demands of their new users.  
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Pál Fodor is a prominent Hungarian turkol-
ogist and historian who devoted most of 
his research attention to the history of 
Ottoman-Hungarian (and later Habsburg) 
relations and Ottoman rule over territories 
of the medieval Hungarian kingdom. He is 
director of the Institute of History of the 
Research Centre for the Humanities of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
The Unbearable Weight of Empire. The 
Ottomans in Central Europe – A Failed At-
tempt at Universal Monarchy (1390‒1566) is 
an attempt by the author to reconsider his 
own previous research, to analyze and re-
assess trends in the study of the Ottoman 
Empire over the last twenty years, and to 
present to a broader public the results of 
the Hungarian specialists on Ottoman his-
tory. The book consists of an introduction 
(pp. 7‒24) and two chapters (pp. 25‒133), 
and is supplied with a list of references (pp. 
135‒160) and a combined index of persons, 
places and terms (pp. 161‒175). 
The end of the fifteenth and the six-
teenth century is one of the most discussed 
periods in the field of Ottoman studies, but 
nevertheless it still represents an inspiring 
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theme for researchers. The attention this 
period has been receiving has its negative ef-
fects too, as it is often included in broader 
discussions about the European sixteenth 
century with only superficial understanding 
of the Ottoman specificities in comparison 
to the contemporary western states. This is 
the reason why the tone of the book, espe-
cially the introduction, is often polemical. 
The author does not reject all the changes 
to the long-established paradigms about 
the Ottoman Empire brought about by the 
so-called imperial or post-colonial turn in 
Ottoman studies, but he calls for a more nu-
anced approach. As the author stresses: “the 
‘Europeanisation’ of Ottoman politics and 
social history coupled with the depiction of 
the empire as a kind of idealized prototype 
for today’s post-national global ambitions, 
seems to me to be a highly dangerous route, 
for under certain conditions it can even 
lead to the falsification of history” (p. 20). 
On the one hand, he accepts and welcomes 
the incorporation of the Ottomans into the 
studies of Early Modern Europe, because he 
considers the Empire as one of its constitu-
ent and important factors. But on the other 
hand, he rejects those approaches that seek 
at all costs to find similarities to the Euro-
pean states and societies, sometimes over-
looking or paying inadequate attention to 
established facts. 
In order to present Ottoman-Hun-
garian relations, with an emphasis on the 
conquests and policies of sultan Süleyman, 
Pál Fodor focuses mainly on diplomatic and 
military history. Adopting a chronological 
approach in presenting the results of his re-
search, the author develops his main ideas 
about the Ottoman policies towards Euro-
pean states and the reasons behind some of 
the most important strategic decisions con-
cerning the future of the empire.
The first chapter, “The Conquest of 
Hungary and the Road to Vienna (1370s‒
1530s)” (pp. 25‒93),1 supplies ample and 
1 As the author notes, this chapter is based 
on two of his previously published articles: 
detailed information not only about the 
Ottoman-Hungarian wars in the discussed 
period but also about the foundations of the 
Ottoman state and military system. Starting 
with the rule of Bayezid I (1389‒1402), the 
author recognizes in the political and sym-
bolic actions of the Ottoman sultans fairly 
consistent policies regarding the interna-
tional position of the empire in the mak-
ing. Their claim to universal imperial rule 
was based both on the Islamic tradition and 
on the idea that the sultans were successors 
both to the Roman emperors and to the pre-
vious Islamic ruling dynasties. Nevertheless, 
the issue of political supremacy was not the 
only impulse behind the expansionist poli-
cies of the Ottoman rulers; they were also 
driven by a number of social, economic and 
military reasons. The question of the causes 
and methods of Ottoman conquests is a 
well-researched one, and Pál Fodor offers its 
concise overview, stressing the importance 
of: the acquisition of booty and territory for 
the economic stability and sustenance of the 
army, the connection of military campaigns 
with a series of undertakings that ensured 
domestic stability, and the religious aspects 
of warfare. While accepting that the jihad as 
an ultimate cause of the creation and growth 
of the empire is an outdated concept, the au-
thor acknowledges that “the religious duty 
of jihad was an important element in Ot-
toman state ideology, one that was not used 
exclusively for the subsequent justification 
and sanctification of secular wars” (p. 45).   
“A Bécsbe vezető út. Az oszmán nagyhatalom 
az 1520-as években [The road leading to Vi-
enna. The Ottoman great power in the 1520s]”, 
in G. Barta. ed., Két tárgyalás Sztambulban. 
Hyeronimus Łaski tárgyalása a töröknél János 
király nevében. Habardanecz János jelentése 1528 
nyári sztambuli tárgyalásairól (Budapest 1996), 
63‒96, and “The Simurg and the Dragon. The 
Ottoman Empire and Hungary (1390‒1533)”, 
in I. Zombori, ed., Fight against the Turk in 
Central Europe in the First Half of the 16th Cen-
tury (Budapest 2004), 9‒35. 
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After a discussion about the general 
situation in the empire and its development 
during the first two centuries of its exist-
ence, the author proceeds to the main sub-
ject of his book, that of the Hungarian-Ot-
toman rivalry. In his view, there is no doubt 
that the Ottoman plan from the very outset 
of hostilities was to conquer the Kingdom 
of Hungary and that the Hungarians were 
aware of that. Although weaker of the two 
belligerent sides, the Hungarian rulers un-
dertook a series of steps to thwart Ottoman 
thrust into their lands (organization and 
support of crusades, offensive campaigns in 
the Balkans, maintenance of buffer states on 
the borders, fortification and military organ-
ization of border defences, conclusion of ar-
mistices with the Ottomans, and search for 
possible allies both in Europe and in Asia). 
The Hungarian-Ottoman conflict started to 
develop more decisively after the ascension 
of sultan Süleyman to the throne in 1520. 
Dismissing theories of some ottomanists 
that the incentive for the war came from the 
West and that it was merely a symbolical 
conflict between the most powerful rulers in 
Europe at the time – Charles V Habsburg 
and Süleyman, Pál Fodor claims that it was 
the young Ottoman ruler who chose Cen-
tral Europe as the main field for his Empire’s 
expansion.
Süleyman’s father Selim I’s obsessive 
campaigning against Iran did bring vast ter-
ritories to the Ottomans but it also strained 
the imperial finances to the limit. Because of 
that Süleyman decided to make a strategic 
turn and to resume the military conquest of 
territories in Europe. Pál Fodor draws atten-
tion to the economic importance of the Ot-
toman Balkan provinces and to the widely 
held belief of the ruling group that further 
expansion into Europe was the best way to 
increase state revenues. At the same time, 
the situation in Europe was more favour-
able for the Ottomans than ever before, as 
the political and military conflict between 
the Habsburgs and the Valois, accompanied 
by a growing religious division in Europe, 
considerably limited the Hungarians’ room 
for manoeuvre and their chances to find 
allies. That was the beginning of a conflict 
that would become one of the defining as-
pects of Ottoman history.
Pál Fodor argues that sultan Süleyman 
had from the beginning a more ambitious 
goal than that of conquering Hungary – he 
planned to defeat the Habsburgs. Neverthe-
less, the quick victory over the Hungarian 
army in 1526 seems to have come as a sur-
prise to the Ottomans and they postponed 
further conquest of Hungarian lands, a 
delay that had important consequences. In 
the author’s view, it was then that the Ot-
tomans missed their best opportunity to in-
flict final defeat to the Hungarian Kingdom 
and incorporate it into the Empire. Such a 
conjunction of favourable circumstances 
had never happened again. Süleyman chose 
to recognize a Hungarian noble, John Sza-
polyai, as king and to start a frontal war with 
the Habsburgs who, after the Battle of Mo-
hacs in 1526, became entangled in Hungar-
ian politics since Ferdinand I Habsburg was 
also proclaimed king of Hungary. As is well 
known, this confrontation led to two unsuc-
cessful campaigns against Vienna in 1529 
and 1532. 
After analyzing all of the advantages, 
both political and military, that the Otto-
mans had over their European rivals, the 
author concludes that Süleyman’s policy to-
ward the Habsburgs during the 1530s grad-
ually wiped out all of these advantages and 
opened the way for a centuries-long struggle. 
The new decade brought the renewal of Ot-
toman conflicts against the Spanish fleet in 
the Mediterranean, against the Portuguese 
in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and 
against Iranian forces on the empire’s east-
ern borders. The Ottomans could no longer 
concentrate only on the northern front, but 
the sultan was under constant pressure from 
the military-bureaucratic elite to enable the 
acquisition of further territory in Europe. 
Besides that, the ideological aspects of the 
conquests should not be underestimated 
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and, possibly, Süleyman’s personal vanity; 
he might have seen Charles V as his only 
worthy rival.
 When the conquest of Hungary was re-
sumed in 1541 the Ottomans captured eas-
ily the territories ruled by the late king John 
Szapolyai, but the Habsburgs had in the 
meantime strengthened their hold over the 
northern and western parts of the Kingdom 
of Hungary. Thus, faced with the strong 
Habsburg presence and without secured 
and easily defensible borders, the new prov-
ince of Buda imposed a considerable drain 
on Ottoman resources. The rivalries were 
put on hold for a while when the Ottoman-
Habsburg peace was concluded in 1547. But 
the mistaken European policy of the Otto-
man Empire, as Pál Fodor sees it, was firmly 
set in place by then. 
The reasons why the author considers 
Süleyman’s approach to the European front 
to be faulty are further analyzed in the sec-
ond chapter, “The Capture of Buda and the 
Road to Szigetvár” (pp. 95‒133).2 In 1541 the 
sultan once again decided not to fully erase 
the existence of the Hungarian state and left 
the lands east of the river Tisza and Tran-
sylvania nominally to the son of king John 
Szapolyai, John Sigismund. Because he was 
just a child, the power was in the hands of 
two Hungarian nobles, Friar George Mar-
tinuzzi and Péter Petrovics. Two years later 
the Ottoman army successfully besieged a 
number of towns and reached Esztergom, 
but the campaign failed to completely end 
the hold of the Habsburgs over the north-
western parts of Hungary. The already men-
tioned peace concluded in 1547 turned out 
2 This chapter is based on a study published 
in: P. Fodor and G. Dávid, “Az ország ügye 
mindenek előtt való”. A szultáni tanács Magya-
rországra vonatkozó rendeletei (1544–1545, 1552) 
[“Affairs of State are Supreme”. The Orders of 
the Ottoman Imperial Council Pertaining to 
Hungary (1544‒1545, 1552)], História köny-
vtár. Okmánytárak, 1 (Budapest: MTA Tör-
ténettudományi Intézete, 2005).
to be a new source of conflicts between the 
Ottomans and the Habsburgs. According 
to this treaty king Ferdinand was obliged to 
pay 30,000 gold coins, which he viewed as a 
gift whereas the Ottomans interpreted it as 
the tribute for the Hungarian lands still in 
Habsburg possession. 
The internal power struggle in the east-
ern Hungarian lands sparked the renewal 
of open warfare when George Martinuzzi 
recognized Ferdinand I’s claim to Tran-
sylvania and invited Austrian troops. The 
group of nobles loyal to John Sigismund 
was defeated in 1550, and the Habsburgs 
proclaimed their occupation of Transylva-
nia the following year. Pál Fodor gives a very 
detailed overview of the military campaigns 
in 1551 and 1552, paying special attention 
to Süleyman’s and his military command-
ers’ tactics. The Ottomans conquered Te-
mesvár and the surrounding region, imme-
diately organizing this territory as the new 
province of Temeşvar. Instead of continu-
ing their conquest into Transylvania, the 
commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army 
Kara Ahmed Pasha decided to act upon 
suggestions presented by the governor of 
the province of Buda and to transfer the 
troops to the northern front in an attempt 
to finally wrest Upper Hungary from the 
Habsburgs. Trying to understand the pos-
sible reason behind this change of plans, 
Pál Fodor points to an idea that circulated 
prominently among the Ottoman ruling 
elite, namely, that financial stability could 
be acquired only by incorporating the mines 
of Upper Hungary. By the end of the hos-
tilities that year it was clear that the deci-
sion was a bad one. Neither were important 
towns in northern Hungary conquered nor 
was the problem of Transylvania solved. In 
1556 Transylvania became an autonomous 
principality under Ottoman suzerainty and 
with John Sigismund Szapolyai as its ruler, 
but the strength of Ottoman rule over it was 
subject to fluctuations and the Habsburgs 
continued to exert influence in the region. 
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The author uses the course and out-
come of these campaigns as one more proof 
of the mistakes the Ottomans made when 
planning their expansion. Many military 
successes notwithstanding, “the absence of 
clearly defined aims and strategies on the 
part of the leaders of the empire” led ulti-
mately to failures on all fronts. The fight 
on five fronts (Hungary, the Mediterranean 
Sea, the Iranian border, Iraq and Hormuz) 
proved to be an overly ambitious task even 
for a state as resourceful as the Ottoman 
Empire was. “Although the sultan’s court 
failed to abandon the wars of conquests 
for reasons of power politics and under the 
pressure of the oversized army and state 
apparatus, there was evidently a growing 
awareness of the futility and ever-decreasing 
profitability of these wars” (p. 127). The in-
ability to prioritize its conflicts and to stick 
to long-term strategic objectives weakened 
the empire and brought about the collapse 
of the so-called classical Ottoman adminis-
trative and financial system. 
The book is concluded with a concise 
account of Süleyman’s last campaign against 
the Habsburgs in 1566. The old sultan died 
while his forces were besieging the fortress 
of Szigetvár and even though they were suc-
cessful, Pál Fodor describes this event as a 
symbol of the failed Ottoman aspiration 
for world domination. The successors of 
the most revered sultan in Ottoman history 
failed to identify the flaws in his policies 
and, as the author reiterates, by repeating 
his mistakes they continued to strain the re-
sources of the empire. 
Although the book presented here is not 
a voluminous one, it provides a good starting 
point for anyone interested in the history of 
the Ottoman conquests in Hungary. The 
author’s goal was not to offer an extensive 
account of the period under study, but rath-
er to sum up the achievements of a decades-
long research, condensing in one volume his 
conclusions about the significance of Otto-
man policies towards the Hungarian front 
for the future of the empire. Frequently 
taking a polemical approach when discuss-
ing the crucial issues, Pál Fodor shows that 
there still is room for further research and 
for reassessing the reign and achievements 
of Süleyman the Lawgiver. 
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Publishing Limited, 2014, xiv + 198 p.
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Studies that deal with contacts between 
East and West and with the influence of 
the Islamic world on Europe in general have 
been growing in number, suggesting new 
analyses, proposing new answers and rais-
ing new questions that deserve closer ex-
amination. In his introduction to the book 
reviewed here, Stephen Ortega points to the 
need for a more in-depth study of relations 
between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, 
but we cannot subscribe to his view that the 
subject has been neglected. 
Because of the complexity of the sub-
ject, many authors have chosen to focus on 
a particular topic, seeking to examine it as 
comprehensively and profoundly as pos-
sible. In her numerous studies, Maria Pia 
Pedani has addressed the topic of diplomat-
ic relations between Venice and Constan-
tinople, Ella-Natalie Rothman has analyzed 
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